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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE


## BULLETIN



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State Department review completed


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110	Nigeria: Nigeria's general parliamentary election on 12  December is expected to determine the make-up of the federal government which will be in power when the countrywith an estimated 35,000,000 peoplebecomes independent next October. The election is therefore regarded as crucial by Nigeria's three major partieseach of which is largely tribal in composition and controls one of the federation's three self-governing regions. One of these, the party of the conservative Moslem rulers of the north, is especially determined to secure a controlling voice in the new federal government. Should it fail to achieve this, its adherents may react violently and possibly attempt to secede.  (Page 3) (Map)	25X
οK	Yemen: Yemeni officials have told the American charge that the recent economic agreements with the United States and a private American firm result from a definite Yemeni policy decision "in favor of the West." They are now urging prompt American action to prove the wisdom of this decision. Yemeni assurances have often been unreliable, but the agreements cited by the Yemenis, together with other recent actions, reflect the Imam's growing suspicion of Soviet and Chinese Communist motives.	
K10	Fiji Islands: The American consul in Suva, on Viti Levu Island, reports riots and anti-European violence have resulted from efforts by the British government of the islands to suppress an oil workers' strike now spreading to other industries. He suggests that evacuation of Americans may become necessary. There is basic antagonism between Fijians and the Indians who comprise more than half the islands' population.	25X1
	11 Dec 59 DAILY BRIEF ii	

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### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Prospects for Indonesia. NIE 62-2-59. 8 Dec 59.

Short-term Prospects for Ecuador. SNIE 95-59. 8 Dec 59.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Nigerian Election

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Nigeria's general election on 12 December is expected to determine the make-up of the federal government in power when this most populous of all African countries—it has an estimated 35,000,000 inhabitants—gains its independence from Britain next October. The election, which is to fill 312 seats in the House of Representatives, is regarded as crucial by Nigeria's three major parties—the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG). Respectively, they represent, for the most part, Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba tribal interests and control the federation's self-governing Northern, Eastern, and Western Regions.

Especially concerned about the outcome are the traditional Moslem rulers of the north--the controlling elements in the NPC-whose greatest fear is domination by the more dynamic Christian and pagan tribesmen of the south. These rulers and their adherents may react violently if they fail to secure a controlling voice in the new government, and might even attempt to secede. Neutral observers have predicted an almost even three-way division of seats among the major parties and their minor-party allies -- a result that would probably enable the NPC, which has an "understanding" with the NCNC leadership, to achieve its minimum goal. However, the election is unprecedented in many respects and forecasting is more than normally hazardous--especially after the NPC's unexpected major defeat in last month's UN-supervised plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons trust territory, an area long administered as an integral part of Nigeria's Northern Region.

Although tribal and regional loyalties will be the most influential factors, intimidation and harassment of opposition forces may also play a significant role in determining the final result, particularly in the north. There the traditional rulers enjoy a freer hand with respect to control over local police than do the southern governments. Moreover, the British, anxious to avoid the complications likely to follow a defeat of the NPC, appear to have taken a more lenient attitude toward that party's use of repressive measures against its opponents.)

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### Yemeni Officials Now Profess to Be Pro-Western

Crown Prince Badr and other prominent Yemeni officials recently assured the American charge in Taiz that Yemen has made a significant policy decision "in favor of the West." The assurances followed Yemeni approval of a basic aid agreement with the United States as well as the signing of several private and government contracts with an American investment company early last month. The officials stated that they and the Imam—who made the decision to accept American assistance—are now "on the spot" to prove the wisdom of their action and dispel the doubts of Yemeni proponents of a "closed door" policy. The charge, who feels that "at least for the time being" Yemen has indeed "turned the corner," has received numerous pleas from Yemeni officials for prompt implementation of the assistance program.

The Yemeni assurances are given some credibility by the			
fact that no new aid agreement was announced following the re-	•		
cent Soviet-Yemeni negotiations in Moscow. Significant factor	3		
in the new policy may be Cairo's improvement of its relations			
with the West and the Imam's growing suspicion of Soviet and			
Chinese Communist motives. The cordial reception granted th	е		
British governor of Aden during his November visit to Yemen			
also seems indicative of the Imam's change of heart.			

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#### THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

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